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WRITING IT RIGHT
How Written Advocacy Shapes 
Doctrine (Part I): Did Bad Briefing 
Decide Lochner v. New York?
By Douglas E. Abrams
 It was Thursday morning, February 
23, 1905, and Chief Justice Melville 
W. Fuller opened oral argument in a 
case destined to shape the course of 
American constitutional history. The 
Supreme Court’s calendar that day 
included a largely unnoticed appeal by 
Joseph Lochner, the owner of a small 
bakery in Utica, a city of about 63,000 
persons in rural upstate New York. 
Three years earlier, the state had fined 
him $50 for employing a worker for 
more than 60 hours a week in violation 
of the state’s Bakeshop Act, a maxi-
mum-hours law passed unanimously 
by both houses of the legislature and 
signed by the governor in 1895.
 By a narrow 5-4 vote, the Court 
reversed the bakery owner’s misde-
meanor conviction. Writing for the 
majority in Lochner v. New York, 
Justice Rufus W. Peckham held that 
the Bakeshop Act violated “liberty of 
contract,” an interest that a few Court 
decisions had found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.1 
The constitutional liberty enjoyed by 
Joseph Lochner and his employees 
alike, wrote Justice Peckham, turned 
on whether the 1895 legislation was 
“a fair, reasonable and appropriate 
exercise of the police power of the 
State,” or whether the legislation was 
“an unreasonable, unnecessary, and 
arbitrary interference with the right of 
the individual to his personal liberty or 
to enter into those contracts in relation 
to labor which may seem to him ap-
propriate and necessary for the support 
of himself and his family.”2
 Lochner’s slender majority chose 
the latter, and Justices John Marshall 
Harlan and Oliver Wendell Holmes 
filed stinging dissents. Justice Har-
lan accused the Court of “seriously 
crippl[ing] the inherent power of the 
States to care for the lives, health and 
wellbeing of their citizens.”3
 In one of the most memorable dis-
sents in Supreme Court history, Justice 
Holmes charged that the majority 
had embraced “an economic theory 
which a large part of the country does 
not entertain.” The theory was, lais-
sez faire economics associated with 
Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinism, 
which taught that a nation’s economy 
develops best when the fittest survive 
in the marketplace free from govern-
ment regulation.4 Holmes argued that 
by empowering courts to impose their 
own economic views on the nation, 
Lochner thwarted “the right of a 
majority to embody their opinions in 
law.”5
 The final word on Lochner’s dual 
touchstones – reasonableness or 
arbitrariness – lay not with the po-
litical branches, but with courts that 
grew increasingly hostile to federal 
or state economic regulation. By the 
time the nation confronted the depths 
of the Depression in the early 1930s, 
the decision had morphed into a 
“constitutional monstrosity” that 
“disembowel[ed] federal and state ef-
forts to protect workers from predatory 
employers.”6  
 The Supreme Court interred Loch-
ner’s economic substantive due pro-
cess doctrine in 1937, but not before 
the Court had struck down nearly 200 
social welfare and regulatory mea-
sures.7  The doctrine’s demise led to 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s Footnote 
Four in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co. (1938), which foreshad-
owed today’s tiered analysis by distin-
guishing the Court’s new deference to 
economic regulation from heightened 
scrutiny of claims implicating civil 
rights and personal liberties.8
 The verdict of history has gener-
ally not been kind to Lochner. Chief 
Justice William H. Rehnquist called 
it “one of the most ill-starred deci-
sions that [the Supreme Court] ever 
rendered.”9 A leading constitutional 
scholar calls Lochner “the most dis-
paraged decision in the entire history 
of the Supreme Court . . ., a decision 
that threatened the very legitimacy of 
judicial review by setting the Court 
against the democratic branches with-
out doctrinal justification or institu-
tional competence.”10 
 More than a century later, Lochner 
remains “one of the most intriguing 
constitutional cases ever decided,”11 
and “[f]ew cases in American history 
continue to attract more attention.”12  
The decision, says one legal historian, 
“continues to hover over constitu-
tional law like a ghost. It haunts every 
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judge’s chambers and every constitu-
tional law classroom.  It gives force 
to the never-ending debate between 
judicial activism and judicial restraint. 
It generates the famed tension between 
judicial review and democracy.”13 
 Lochner’s immortality highlights 
the choices of two undecided “swing” 
Justices to join the 5-4 majority. Might 
Lochner have come out the other 
way if the brief filed by the losing 
New York Attorney General had not 
appeared so paltry next to Joseph 
Lochner’s sterling brief (which, as 
I recount below, the bakery owner’s 
counsel wrote with a significant assist 
from a Mizzou law professor)? The 
question is one of the great “what if’s” 
of American constitutional history 
because the contrary decision would 
likely have charted an alternate consti-
tutional path to destinations unknown. 
 The State of New York was “out-
briefed” by a resourceful defendant 
and his counsel. Even for today’s 
lawyers who may never argue an ap-
peal so profound, Lochner’s evident 
turnabout from a razor-thin victory for 
the state to a victory for the convicted 
defendant underscores judicial reliance 
on written advocacy in the adversary 
system of civil and criminal justice.
 This reliance assumed the Supreme 
Court spotlight most recently in 2008, 
when Kennedy v. Louisiana held, 5-4, 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
imposition of the death penalty for 
rape of a child where the crime did not 
result, and was not intended to result, 
in the victim’s death.14 The Justices 
decided Kennedy without citing or dis-
cussing a relevant two-year-old con-
gressional enactment that the parties 
had overlooked, and that neither the 
Justice Department nor amici curiae 
had brought to the Court’s attention.  
 This Part I discusses the Court’s 
internal deliberations in Lochner. In 
Precedent’s Spring issue, Part II will 
discuss Kennedy’s embarrassing over-
sight and recount the institutional chal-
lenges that it caused the Court. Loch-
ner and Kennedy together demonstrate 
the contemporary vitality of Justice 
Felix Frankfurter’s message that in the 
adversary system of civil and criminal 
justice, “the judicial process [is] at its 
best” when courts receive “compre-
hensive briefs and powerful arguments 
on both sides.”15
Nineteen Pages That 
Changed History
 To establish that New York’s maxi-
mum hours law was an unreasonable 
exercise of the state’s police power, 
Joseph Lochner’s counsel submit-
ted a lengthy, carefully researched 
brief whose appendix supplemented 
legal doctrine with research from 
medical journals indicating that bakery 
work was not inherently hazardous 
to employees’ health.16 One scholar 
has called the submission “an in-
cipient ‘Brandeis Brief.”’17 The term 
“Brandeis Brief” today describes a 
filing that combines legal analysis 
with relevant evidence from the social 
sciences, but lawyer Louis D. Brandeis 
did not prevail with his fabled Su-
preme Court submission until Muller 
v. Oregon, which distinguished Loch-
ner three years after the New York 
bakery owner’s brief provided the 
future Justice a useful template.18
The Mizzou Connection
 Though largely overlooked today, 
the University of Missouri directly 
influenced Joseph Lochner’s brief. 
According to Professor David J. Seipp, 
“[a] principal architect of Lochner’s 
substantive due process argument 
[was] the young firebrand conservative 
law professor Christopher G. Tiede-
man,” who taught at the University of 
Missouri from 1881 to 1891.19 While a 
member of the Mizzou faculty, Ti-
edeman wrote his influential treatise, 
Limitations of Police Power (1886), 
whose preface embraced Social Dar-
winism and warned that “Socialism, 
Communism, and Anarchism are ram-
pant throughout the civilized world” 
because “the State is called on to pro-
tect the weak against the shrewdness 
of the stronger.”20  
 Lessons from Tiedeman’s treatise 
were not lost on Joseph Lochner’s 
counsel. “For people such as . . . 
Christopher Tiedeman,” writes Profes-
sor Paul Kens, “substantive due pro-
cess and liberty of contract represented 
not only reasonable but necessary 
interpretations of the Constitution. In 
their eyes the theory of law that was 
finalized in Lochner was supported by 
the spirit and purpose of that docu-
ment.”21
Overconfidence, Carelessness 
or Lack of Personal 
Commitment
 The New York Attorney General’s 
office evidently did not take Joseph 
Lochner’s Supreme Court appeal 
seriously, a costly lapse that seems 
particularly surprising because the 
state’s two appellate courts had each 
affirmed the conviction by only 
scant one-vote margins over strong 
dissents.22 Attorney General Julius 
M. Mayer’s “incredibly sketchy”2319-
page brief provided the justices little 
factual analysis or legal argument, 
few citations to precedent, and barely 
any mention of medical authorities 
which plausibly indicated that toiling 
12 hours per day for six to seven days 
each week in damp, dusty, rat-infested 
bakeries in urban slum tenement 
cellars debilitated most workers 
before they turned 45 and caused 
many to die young.24 The Attorney 
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General did not even try to expand 
on medical discussion advanced by a 
concurring judge when the New York 
Court of Appeals upheld Lochner’s 
conviction.25
 Labor leader Samuel Gompers 
said later that the Court might 
have decided Lochner differently 
if the Justices could have seen for 
themselves the squalid working 
conditions that marked the nation’s 
bakeries, including the one in Utica, 
New York.26 With the Justices unable 
to take testimony or receive other live 
evidence from eyewitnesses or expert 
witnesses, however, the parties’ briefs 
were the Court’s eyes and ears. In 
a case that ultimately turned on the 
Justices’ perceptions of reasonableness 
or arbitrariness, the state’s meager 
written submission squandered any 
opportunity to paint a persuasive 
picture with information gleaned from 
the medical literature.
 Historians have speculated about 
why the state Attorney General’s 
office paid only lip service to Joseph 
Lochner’s Supreme Court appeal. 
The likely reasons do not reflect well 
on the office’s approach to advocacy. 
Perhaps Attorney General Mayer 
assumed a relatively easy victory 
because the Court, in Holden v. Hardy, 
had upheld a state’s maximum hours 
statute for coal miners in 1898 by a 
seemingly comfortable 7-2 margin.27 
Professor Kens suggests that, even 
if not overconfident, the Attorney 
General may have lacked enthusiasm 
for the challenged Bakeshop Act 
because he personally opposed most 
economic regulatory legislation.28 
Perhaps the Attorney General brushed 
aside Lochner’s case because his 
office faced deadlines in another 
Supreme Court appeal that seemed 
more important, though the decision in 
the other appeal would ultimately pass 
into history largely unremembered.29
The Court’s Deliberations
 Whatever the impulse for the state’s 
evident inattention in Lochner, the 
imbalance that marked the parties’ 
briefs may have turned a close deci-
sion for the state into a close deci-
sion for the bakery owner. Evidence 
indicates that Justice Harlan initially 
drafted the opinion of the Court, and 
that Justice Peckham initially drafted a 
dissent. Justice Harlan’s son later said 
that his father’s original draft was for 
the majority, and another commentator 
argued that the tone and structure of 
Justice Harlan’s ultimate dissent sug-
gest the same.30
 The two swing votes, Justices Henry 
Billings Brown and Joseph McKenna, 
ended up joining the 5-4 majority 
under circumstances that suggest that 
the parties’ briefing influenced the out-
come. Justice Brown had written the 
majority opinion upholding maximum 
hours legislation for mine workers in 
Holden v. Hardy, and neither he nor 
Justice McKenna had previously voted 
to strike down state labor legislation 
for violating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.31
 The two swing justices likely 
switched from Harlan to Peckham 
during the Court’s internal delibera-
tions. Professor David E. Bernstein 
concludes that “the unusual votes of 
Brown and McKenna . . . can most 
plausibly be attributed to the creativ-
ity of Lochner’s brief in presenting a 
statistics-filled appendix showing that 
baking was not an especially unhealth-
ful profession, combined with the 
singularly ineffective brief filed by 
New York.”32
 On April 17, Lochner’s five-Justice 
majority – with Justices Brown and 
McKenna safely on board – an-
nounced that “[t]here is, in our judg-
ment, no reasonable foundation for 
holding [the 1895 Bakeshop Act] to 
be necessary or appropriate as a health 
law to safeguard the public health, or 
the health of the individuals who are 
following the trade of a baker.”33 To 
the contrary, the majority concluded, 
the Act had “no . . . direct relation to, 
and no . . . substantial effect upon, the 
health of the employee.”34
Lochner’s Lessons in Advocacy
 Perhaps through overconfidence, 
carelessness or lack of personal com-
mitment, the New York Attorney 
General suffered a narrow defeat in 
Lochner following his office’s inad-
equate briefing. The Justices’ evident 
turnabout reminds lawyers that no 
victory is “easy” until after entry of 
final judgment and exhaustion of the 
appellate process, that deadlines and 
other law office constraints are poor 
excuses for half-hearted advocacy, and 
that every case deserves the advocate’s 
zeal regardless of his or her personal 
feelings about the cause.
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Missouri Bar Asks Lawyers to Voluntarily 
Report Annual Pro Bono Hours
Missouri Lawyers Lack Recognition for Their Pro Bono Service
Many Missouri lawyers generously help ensure that justice extends to those 
less fortunate by making pro bono work an integral part of their practices. 
However, this honorable commitment often lacks the recognition it deserves 
within the legal profession and is for the most part unknown to the general 
public.
Voluntary Reporting Can Change That
The Missouri Bar hopes to change this by asking lawyers to voluntarily 
report the number of hours they commit to pro bono work annually. This 
reporting will provide valuable information about the collective and individual 
pro bono efforts of Missouri lawyers, help the bar better recognize these 
efforts, and inspire other lawyers to perform pro bono services. By reporting, 
individual lawyers will play a vital role in this effort.
Reporting Your Pro Bono Hours is Quick and Easy
Just go to The Missouri Bar website (www.mobar.org) and follow the link to 
the pro bono reporting form. You will need your members-only bar number 
and PIN to complete the brief form.
Lawyers can report total pro bono hours for 2010 now and 2011 hours 
throughout the year or at year-end.
